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Abstract
Networked control systems consist of distributed sensors and actuators that communicate via a
wireless network. The use of an open wireless medium and unattended deployment leaves these systems
vulnerable to intelligent adversaries whose goal is to disrupt the system performance. In this paper, we
study the wormhole attack on a networked control system, in which an adversary establishes a link
between two distant regions of the network by using either high-gain antennas, as in the out-of-band
wormhole, or colluding network nodes as in the in-band wormhole. Wormholes allow the adversary to
violate the timing constraints of real-time control systems by delaying or dropping packets, and cannot
be detected using cryptographic mechanisms alone. We study the impact of the wormhole attack on the
network flows and delays and introduce a passivity-based control-theoretic framework for modeling the
wormhole attack. We develop this framework for both the in-band and out-of-band wormhole attacks
as well as complex, hereto-unreported wormhole attacks consisting of arbitrary combinations of in-and
out-of band wormholes. We integrate existing mitigation strategies into our framework, and analyze the
throughput, delay, and stability properties of the overall system. Through simulation study, we show
that, by selectively dropping control packets, the wormhole attack can cause disturbances in the physical
plant of a networked control system, and demonstrate that appropriate selection of detection parameters
mitigates the disturbances due to the wormhole while satisfying the delay constraints of the physical
system.
1Corresponding author. Email: lb2@uw.edu
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2I. INTRODUCTION
Cyber-physical systems that are deployed over a wide geographic area often consist of dis-
tributed embedded devices, such as sensors and actuators, that exchange sensed data and control
signals via a wireless network [1], thus forming a networked control system. When deployed
in critical applications such as the smart grid, the real-time control system may be targeted by
adversaries attempting to drive it to an undesirable or unsafe operating point. By introducing and
modifying delays in the communication network, the adversary can cause violations of the timing
constraints that are critical in maintaining safe operation of real-time cyber-physical systems [2].
The wormhole attack, first introduced in the context of wireless routing [3], is one such attack
that exploits the time delays and violates the timing constraints of the targeted system. In the
wormhole attack, an adversary records messages observed in one region of the network and
replays them in a different region [4]. By doing so, the adversary creates a communication
link (a wormhole tunnel) between two end points in otherwise disjoint geographic areas. This
can be accomplished by either compromised or colluding network nodes, known as the in-band
wormhole [5] or via a side channel such as high-gain directional antennas, known as the out-of-
band wormhole [3]. Unsuspecting network nodes will route network traffic through the wormhole.
Once significant traffic starts flowing through the wormhole, the adversary can selectively drop
or delay time-critical packets in order to destabilize or degrade the system performance. As the
attack replays or reroutes valid messages, it does not require compromising any cryptographic
keys, and hence cannot be detected using cryptographic verification mechanisms alone [6].
While the wormhole attack does not violate cryptographic mechanisms, it does violate the
physical constraints imposed by propagation delay and relative position of nodes. Current ap-
proaches that detect these violations include include graph-based methods [6], statistical methods
[5], and timing analysis [3]. However, the current security analysis of the mitigation strategies
do not incorporate the time-varying node behaviors or the adaptive strategy of the adversary.
Hence, while the wormhole attack can significantly degrade the performance of cyber-physical
systems, there is currently no analytical approach that represents the impact of wormholes and
mitigation on the system dynamics. Furthermore, the composition of different types of wormhole
attacks and the impact on system performance has not been studied.
In this paper, we introduce one such control-theoretic framework for modeling and mitigating
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3the wormhole attack on networked control systems. The proposed framework models the impact
of wormholes, as well as the integration of existing mitigation strategies, on the allocation of
network flows and resulting delays. Our approach models three interdependent components,
namely, flow allocation by network nodes, delay characteristics introduced by wormholes, and
mitigation algorithms employed by the network. We develop this framework for both out-of-band
and in-band wormholes. In addition, using our framework, we are able to model, represent and
mitigate complex wormhole attacks that simultaneously make use of both in- and out-of-band
wormholes. For each case, we prove that the flow allocation, wormhole delay, and mitigation
components can be modeled as a passive dynamical system which allows the characterization
of flow allocation and delay at the steady state. Since our framework is in control-theoretic
language, it enables ease of composition with control models of cyber-physical systems. We
make the following specific contributions:
• For the out-of-band wormhole, we develop dynamical models for the flow allocation by
network nodes, the delays introduced by wormholes, and network mitigation. For the flow
allocation by network nodes, we introduce a distributed algorithm for each node to adaptively
divide its flow among a set of paths based on their delays. We prove this algorithm converges
to a unique Wardrop equilibrium, in which no source can reduce its delay by shifting flow
to a different path.
• We model the delay characteristics of out-of-band wormhole links based on the packet
dropping rate. We map the packet dropping strategy to the optimization problem of selecting
the optimal dropping rate which balances the goals of increase in delay and attracting flows
to the wormhole. We then develop a dynamical model to characterize the effect of timing
based mitigation mechanisms on the flow allocation.
• We then prove the dynamical systems describing the flow allocation, delays introduced by
wormhole, and the mitigation schemes are passive. We leverage the passivity property to
prove that the interconnection of these models is globally asymptotically stable with respect
to a unique equilibrium point.
• For the in-band wormhole, we derive the delays introduced by wormhole as a function
of number of colluding nodes and the network topology. We represent statistics based
mitigation method against in-band wormhole as a penalty added to suspected wormhole
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4links during the flow allocation. We then prove that the flow allocation algorithm introduced
earlier together with the delay and mitigation models in the in-band case, can be represented
as an interconnection of passive systems, which converges to a stable equilibrium point.
• We use our framework to model more complex wormhole attacks, which consists of both
in- and out-of-band wormholes. Our approach composes the models of individual wormhole
links via parallel interconnections of passive systems.
• We illustrate our approach via a numerical study, in which we compare the flow allocation
and delay resulting from both out-of-band and in-band wormhole attacks and the detection
mechanisms, and evaluate the impact of the wormhole attack and mitigation on a cyber-
physical system. In the out-of-band case, simulation results show that detection mechanisms
reduces the flow traversing through the wormhole link at the cost of increased delay. For
the in-band case, simulation results suggest that detection mechanisms enable the source
rates to converge to the same equilibrium regardless of the presence of a wormhole. We
find that an adversary who creates an out-of-band wormhole can cause large disturbances
on the physical plant by selectively dropping packets that are allocated to the wormhole
link. We empirically determine parameters of the mitigation strategy that reduces the flow
allocated to the wormhole link, while satisfying the system’s delay constraints.
Our proposed framework enables quantitative analysis of the impact of the wormhole attack on
system performance and the effectiveness of different mitigation mechanisms, as well as modeling
of any arbitrary composition of in-band and out-of-band wormholes. Hence, this approach is
complementary to recent efforts towards a science of cyber-security [7], where the goal is a
scientific approach to characterizing, composing, and mitigating security threats. Moreover, our
proposed framework explicitly captures the temporal dynamics of the attack and mitigation,
including the adaptation and co-evolution of the adversary and defender strategies.
The paper is organized as follows. We present the related work in Section II. Section III
presents our assumptions of the network and adversary capabilities, as well as a description of
the wormhole attack. Section IV discusses our proposed modeling and mitigation framework
for the out-of-band wormhole. Section V presents our approach to modeling and mitigating in-
band wormholes. Section VI introduces passivity-based models and mitigation for joint out-of-
and in-band wormholes. Numerical results are contained in Section VII. Section VIII concludes
the paper. Appendix A presents background on passivity. To improve readability, some of the
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5lengthier proofs of our results are contained in Appendix B.
II. RELATED WORK
The wormhole attack was originally identified as a form of routing misbehavior in ad hoc
and sensor networks [4]. In [3], the packet leash defense was proposed, in which each packet
is given a fixed expiration time and any packet received after its expiration time is discarded.
Valid packets may also be discarded, however, due to propagation delays or clock skews between
nodes, leading to a trade-off between detection effectiveness and network performance. Local
broadcast keys, which are cryptographic keys that are distributed using specialized guard nodes
and known only to nodes within a local neighborhood, were introduced in [6]. Anomalies in
link delays, caused by propagation through the wormhole tunnel, are analyzed in [8], in which
an FFT-based approach to identifying likely wormholes was presented. While these methods can
be used to mitigate the impact of the wormhole attack, an analytical approach to dynamically
tune each method in response to changes in the network state and adversary behavior, as well
as estimate the stable operating point of the system, is currently lacking.
The in-band wormhole, in which the adversary creates the appearance of a link between two
colluding nodes by tunneling packets through valid nodes, was identified as a security threat in
[5]. The authors observed that the wormhole tunnel itself could contain routing loops, diminishing
its effectiveness, a phenomenon they denoted as wormhole collapse. Necessary and sufficient
conditions for the adversary to avoid wormhole collapse are derived in [9]. A statistical approach
to detecting in-band wormholes, based on identifying increased delays or packet drops through
wormhole links using sequential probability ratio testing, was studied in [10]. Our framework
incorporates the probability of wormhole collapse, as well as the statistical detection algorithms,
when modeling the temporal dynamics of the flow rates and resulting delays.
Passivity-based techniques have been used to model network flow control and derive novel
flow allocation algorithms in [11]. The work of [11] fits within the broader context of dual
decomposition-based methods for designing network protocols as distributed algorithms for
solving network optimization problems [12]. Passivity of networked control systems with packet
drops was studied in [13]. In [13], the authors studied the passivity of networked control systems
where the plant dynamics switches between open and closed loop due to control packet drops.
Currently, however, such models do not incorporate security threats or network defenses.
September 17, 2018 DRAFT
6In preliminary versions of this work [14], [15], we studied passive dynamical systems as a
framework for modeling and mitigating network security threats. In [14], we presented passive
dynamical models of the node capture, malware propagation, and control channel jamming
attacks, and demonstrated that these attacks can be composed while preserving passivity. In [15],
we studied a class of adaptive network defense mechanisms against control channel jamming
that satisfy the passivity property, and demonstrated that the robustness of the system to delays
and detection errors is affected by the parameters of the passive defense. Neither of these works,
however, consider network flow-based attacks such as the wormhole attack.
III. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we state our assumptions regarding the capabilities of the network and adver-
sary. We then give background on the wormhole attack.
A. Network Model
We consider a wireless network of n nodes. We assume that two nodes can communicate
directly if their positions are within the maximum node communication range. We denote the
set of links by L, with |L| = L. In order to facilitate sensing and control of the system, network
flows must be maintained between a set of source nodes S and destination nodes D. The ordered
pair (Si, Di) denotes the source and destination of flow i. We assume that source Si maintains
a constant rate ri, and that flows are originating from the set of sources. External flows are not
considered in this paper.
Any source and destination pair that is not in direct radio range relies on multi-hop com-
munication. Since the topology changes due to node sleep/wake cycles and nodes joining and
leaving the network, each source Si uses a distributed routing protocol to identify a set of source-
destination paths Pi = {P1, . . . , Pmi}. The number of paths for source-destination pair (Si, Di)
is denoted as mi.
B. Adversary Model
The network is deployed in a hostile environment where one or more mobile adversaries are
present. We assume that each adversary is capable of eavesdropping as well as recording and
replaying eavesdropped messages, including routing protocol messages. By eavesdropping on
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7routing protocol messages, the adversary determines the network topology. The adversary is also
capable of physically capturing the unattended nodes. Once the adversary has compromised a
node, the adversary can extract its cryptographic secrets. This enables the adversary to replace
the captured node with a malicious node assuming the identity of the captured node. Malicious
nodes are under the control of the adversary and are capable of colluding with other malicious
nodes. One such collusion attack is the wormhole, described as follows.
(a) (b)
Fig. 1. Illustration of the two classes of wormhole. (a) In an out-of-band wormhole, the adversary creates a low-latency link
between two network regions using a high-capacity channel, such as a directional antenna or wired link. (b) In an in-band
wormhole, the adversary compromises network nodes in different regions and advertises a false one-hop link between two
compromised nodes. The link actually consists of a path between unsuspecting valid nodes.
C. Wormhole Attack and Mitigation
In a wormhole attack, an adversary creates a covert path (referred to as wormhole tunnel)
that connects two distant regions of the network. Since the wormhole creates the appearance of
a short path between distant regions of the network, shortest-path routing protocols will route
a large fraction of the network traffic through the wormhole tunnel. The adversary can then
control this traffic and selectively drop packets, increase delays, or create routing instability. The
wormhole link can also be used to record messages overheard in one network region, such as
sensed data or control signals, and replay those messages in order to disrupt the performance
of one or more system components. The wormhole can be further classified as out-of-band or
in-band, depending on the nature of the wormhole tunnel.
1) Out-of-band wormhole formation: In the out-of-band wormhole, an adversary establishes a
low-latency link (wormhole link) between two distant regions of the network (Figure 1(a)). This
may be done through wired links that are not available to network nodes, or through high-gain
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8directional wireless antennas. Once the adversary has gained control over a large amount of
packets flowing through the wormhole link, the adversary can disrupt the system performance
by dropping or delaying packets. In order to create an out-of-band wormhole, the adversary does
not need to compromise any node or cryptographic secrets.
2) Out-of-band wormhole mitigation: The out-of-band wormhole is based on replaying mes-
sages that are intended for a local geographic area in a different geographic region. As a result
of physical constraints on propagation through the medium, the time for a message to propagate
to a node’s immediate neighbors will be less than the time required for the message to propagate
to the eavesdropper, traverse the wormhole tunnel, and then propagate to any nodes on the other
side of the wormhole tunnel. This discrepancy is the basis for the packet leash defense [3], in
which the sender of each packet attaches an expiration time to the packet, equal to ts + Rc + ∆,
where ts is the transmission time, Rc is the propagation time, and ∆ is an estimate of the clock
skew between the sending and receiving nodes. All packets received after their expiration time
are discarded. Packets are signed using message authentication codes to prevent the adversary
from modifying the expiration time.
3) In-band wormhole formation: In the in-band wormhole attack, an adversary compromises
two nodes in different regions of the network and falsely advertises a one-hop link between those
nodes via the routing protocol. As in the out-of-band case, the appearance of this short path
will result in a large traffic flow into the two compromised nodes. The adversary then chooses
a path, consisting of both valid and compromised nodes, between the two nodes comprising
the wormhole tunnel. The in-band wormhole requires the adversary to compromise at least two
nodes, but does not require any specialized hardware. The in-band wormhole is illustrated in
Figure 1(b).
4) In-band wormhole collapse: In order to create an in-band wormhole, the adversary must
avoid wormhole collapse, which occurs under the following conditions. The wormhole tunnel
consists of a path between two colluding nodes, denoted W1 and W2. The intermediate nodes in
the tunnel, however, will attempt to route packets from W1 to W2 using shortest-path routing.
Since the wormhole tunnel is advertised as a one-hop link between W1 and W2, any packets sent
from W1 to W2 are likely to be forwarded back to W1, creating a routing loop (Figure 2(a)).
To avoid wormhole collapse, the adversary must capture a third node, denoted W3. Instead of
routing packets directly from W1 to W2 in the wormhole link, the adversary sends packets from
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Fig. 2. Illustration of the collapse of in-band wormholes. (a) When the colluding nodes W1 and W2 advertise a one-hop link
between them, the intermediate nodes on the path between W1 and W2 will attempt to forward packets through the advertised
(W1,W2) link, creating a routing loop that causes the wormhole to collapse. (b) By tunneling packets to an intermediate node
W3 satisfying the conditions of Lemma 3.1, which then forwards the packets to W2, the adversary avoids wormhole collapse.
W1 to W3, and then from W3 to W2, as shown in Figure 2(b). The conditions on W3 to prevent
wormhole collapse are given by the following lemma.
Lemma 3.1 ([9]): Let d(i, j) denote the length of the shortest path between nodes i and j.
Then the wormhole tunnel formed by colluding nodes W1, W2, and W3 does not collapse if
d(W1,W3) < d(W2,W3) + 3.
5) In-band wormhole mitigation: Since the in-band wormhole is mounted using compromised
nodes and their stored cryptographic keys, defenses against the out-of-band wormhole may be
ineffective against in-bandwidth wormholes. The in-band wormhole, however, will incur longer
delays than the out-of-band wormhole, since it relies on a multi-hop path of network nodes
to forward packets. By performing statistical analysis, the network nodes can identify one-hop
links with exceptionally long delays and/or packet-loss rates, which are then suspected of being
wormhole links and ignored for routing purposes [5].
IV. PROPOSED PASSIVITY FRAMEWORK FOR OUT-OF-BAND WORMHOLE
In this section, we introduce our passivity-based framework for modeling and mitigating
out-of-band wormholes in a networked control system. Our model considers the effect of the
wormhole attack and mitigation on the delay and flow allocation of the network traffic. We
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first develop a dynamical model for the flow allocation by the network nodes. We then model
the delays experienced due to the out-of-band wormhole, followed by the effect of mitigation
mechanisms. Lastly, we consider the interconnection of these three dynamical models and
characterize the flow allocation and delay at the unique equilibrium point via a passivity-based
approach.
A. Dynamical Model of Network Flow Allocation
We assume that each source node Si maintains a flow with total rate ri to destination Di.
This flow is divided among the paths Pi used by source Si in order to minimize the overall
delay. Let rP (t) denote the flow allocated to path P ∈ Pi at time t, so that
∑
P∈Pi rP = ri. The
vector of flow rates is denoted ri(t) , {rP (t) : P ∈ Pi}. Furthermore, let fl(rl) denote the delay
experienced on link l when the rate of flow on link l is given by rl. Let qP (rP ) ,
∑
l∈P fl(rl)
denote the total delay on path P , equal to the sum of the delays on each link comprising the path,
where {l ∈ P} denotes summing over the links l in path P . Finally, define the L× (∑ni=1mi)
matrix A by
AlP =
 1, link l in path P0, else
so that rl = (Ar)l.
Achieving the minimum possible delay is equivalent to finding {rP : P ∈ Pi} satisfying
min
{∑
P∈Pi
rP qP (rP ) :
∑
P∈Pi
rP = ri
}
,
since rP qP (rP ) is the total delay on path P ,
∑
P∈Pi rP is the overall delay experienced on all
paths, and
∑
P∈Pi rP = ri is a constraint on the total throughput. Determining whether this
condition is satisfied requires the source Si to determine the incremental change in delay from
shifting flow from path P to path P ′ for all P, P ′ ∈ Pi. The incremental change, however,
depends on parameters that the source cannot observe, such as the rates of the other sources
and the excess capacity of each link, and hence cannot be computed directly by the source.
Instead, we assume that each source attempts to minimize the total delay based on the currently
observed delay characteristics of each link. This condition is formalized by the concept of a
Wardrop equilibrium [16], defined as follows.
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Definition 4.1: The flow allocation {rP : P ∈ Pi} is a Wardrop equilibrium for source Si if
for any path P , rP > 0 implies that qP ≤ qP ′ for all P ′ ∈ Pi.
Definition 4.1 implies that a positive flow rate is allocated to path P ∈ Pi if and only if
there is no path P ′ currently experiencing lower delays than path P . We now introduce flow
rate dynamics that, when used by each source Si to choose ri(t), cause the network to converge
to a Wardrop equilibrium. We prove convergence to the Wardrop equilibrium by first proving
that ri is a steady state for the dynamics if and only if it is a Wardrop equilibrium, and that
the Wardrop equilibrium is unique. We then use a passivity-based approach to prove the system
converges to a unique steady state and hence converges to the Wardrop equilibrium.
Let Pmini (q) denote a time-varying index satisfying
Pmini (q) ∈ arg min {qP : P ∈ Pi}.
We define the dynamics of the flow rate rP (t) allocated to path P ∈ Pi by
r˙P (t) =
 −{qP (rP (t))− qPmin(rPmini (t))}
rP
+ , P 6= Pmini (q)
−∑P 6=Pmini (q) r˙P (t), P = Pmini (q) (1)
where
{x}rP+ =
 0, x > 0 and rP = 0x, else
Equation (1) has the following interpretation. When the observed delay on path P is greater
than the delay observed on path Pmin, which has the minimum delay of any path in Pi, the
flow allocated to path P is reduced if it is positive. When the path P has the minimum delay of
any path in Pi (P = Pmini (q)), additional flow is allocated to path P (note that, since r˙P (t) ≤ 0
if P 6= Pmini (q), −
∑
P 6=Pmini (q) r˙P (t) ≥ 0). Since the total flow from source Si is constant, the
dynamics are chosen such that
∑
P∈Pi r˙P (t) = 0. The following proposition verifies that the
dynamics (1) define a feasible flow allocation for all time t.
Proposition 4.2: Suppose that
∑
P∈Pi rP (0) = ri and rP (0) ≥ 0 for all P ∈ Pi. Then for all
t > 0,
∑
P∈Pi rP (t) = ri and rP (t) ≥ 0 for all P ∈ Pi.
A proof is given in the appendix. We next show that the equilibria of (1) are equivalent to
the Wardrop equilibria of the system.
Proposition 4.3: The dynamics (1) have an equilibrium at r∗i if and only if r
∗
i is a Wardrop
equilibrium.
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Proof: First, suppose that r˙P (t) = 0 for all P ∈ Pi, and assume that ri(t) is not a Wardrop
equilibrium. By Definition 4.1, there exists P such that qP (rP ) > qPmini (t)(rPmini ) and rP (t) > 0.
The condition r˙P (t) = 0 implies that
{qP (rP )− qPmini (r∗P )}
rP
+ = 0. (2)
Since qP (rP ) > qPmini (rPmini ), condition (2) holds if and only if rP = 0, contradicting the
assumption that rP > 0.
Now, suppose that ri is a Wardrop equilibrium. The goal is to show that ri is an equilibrium
of (1). Consider P ∈ Pi, and suppose that P 6= Pmini . We show that r˙P (t) = 0 by separately
considering the cases where qP (rP ) = qPmini (rPmini ) and qP (rP ) > qPmini (rPmini ) (qP (rP ) <
qPmini (rPmini ) contradicts the definition of P
min
i ).
If qP (rP ) = qPmini (r
∗
P ), then r˙P (t) = 0. On the other hand, if qP (rP ) > qPmini (rPmini ), then the
delay experienced on path P exceeds the minimum delay, and therefore rP (t) = 0 by Definition
4.1. Hence
r˙P (t) = {qP (rP )− qPmini (rPmini )}
rP
+ = 0.
Finally, we have
r˙Pmini = −
∑
P 6=Pmini
r˙P = 0,
which proves that ri is an equilibrium point of (1).
Proposition 4.3 implies that the equilibria of (1) are equal to the Wardrop equilibria of the
system. The following Lemma proves the equilibria of (1) are unique.
Lemma 4.4: If the functions fl : R→ R are strictly increasing for all links l, then there exists
a unique equilibrium for the dynamics (1).
A proof of Lemma 4.4 is given in the appendix. Finally, we show that the dynamics (1) con-
verge to the unique Wardrop equilibrium. As a first step, we present an equivalent representation
of (1). We define the system H˜1, which takes input u1 ∈ Rmi , by
(H˜1)

˙˜rP (t) = −{q∗P − uP − q∗Pmin(q∗−u) + uPmin(q∗−u)}rP+ , P 6= Pmini (q∗ − u)
˙˜rP (t) = −
∑
P 6=Pmin(q∗−u) ˙˜rP (t), P = P
min
i (q
∗ − u)
y˜P (t) = ˙˜rP (t), ∀P ∈ Pi
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We define a system (H˜2), which takes input u(2)(t) ∈ RL, as
(H˜2)
 z˙l(t) = u
(2)
l (t)
yl(t) = fl(zl(t))− fl(z∗l )
where z∗l is the rate through link l in the unique equilibrium guaranteed by Lemma 4.4. We let
(H˜) denote the system formed by a negative feedback interconnection between (H˜1) and (H˜2)
(Figure 3). The following proposition establishes the equivalence between the state dynamics
defined by (1) and system (H˜).
Fig. 3. Illustration of the flow allocation and link delay dynamics (H˜1) and (H˜2). The passive system (H˜1) represents the flow
allocation by each source based on the observed delays at each path. The passive system (H˜2) represents the delays experienced
at each link as a function of the flows allocated to the link. Since (H˜1) is strictly passive and (H˜2) is passive, the overall system
is asymptotically stable (Theorem 4.6).
Proposition 4.5: For all t, r˜(t) = r(t).
A proof is given in the appendix. The following theorem establishes that the flow rate allocation
converges to the unique Wardrop equilibrium.
Theorem 4.6: Suppose that
∑
P∈Pi rP (0) = ri. If the link delay fl(rl) is strictly increasing as
a function of rl for all links l, then
lim
t→∞
ri(t) = r
∗
i ,
where r∗i is the unique Wardrop equilibrium.
Proof: It suffices to show that the system (H˜1) is strictly passive from input u˜
(1)
P (t) to output
y˜
(1)
P (t) and the system (H˜2) is passive from input u
(2)
l (t) to output y
(2)
l (t).
Define the function V1(r) = q∗T (r− r∗), and let q = q∗ − u. Then
V˙1(r) = q
∗T r˙ = qT r˙+ u˜(1)(t)T r˙.
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To prove strict passivity, it therefore suffices to show that qT r˙ < 0. Without loss of generality,
suppose that |Pi| = mi + 1 and Pmini (q∗ − u) = Pmini (q) = mi + 1. Then
qT r˙ =
mi+1∑
j=1
qj r˙j(t) =
mi∑
j=1
qj r˙j(t)−
mi∑
j=1
qmi+1r˙j(t)
= −
mi∑
j=1
qj(qj − qmi+1)rj+ +
m∑
j=1
qmi+1(qj − qmi+1)rj+ .
By definition, (qj − qmi+1)rj+ ≥ 0. Furthermore, qj ≥ qmi+1 for all j, and so
qT r˙ ≤ −
mi∑
j=1
qmi+1(qj − qmi+1)rj+ +
mi∑
j=1
qmi+1(qj − qmi+1)rj+ ,
thus establishing the passivity of (H˜1). To prove passivity of (H˜2), define the storage function
V2(zl) =
∫ zl−z∗l
0
fl(s+ z
∗
l )− fl(z∗l ) ds.
We have
V˙2(zl(t)) = (fl(zl(t))− fl(z∗l ))z˙l(t) = u(2)l (t)y˜(2)l (t),
implying passivity of (H˜2).
Theorem 4.6 implies that the flow allocation converges to a unique equilibrium when the
delays experienced at each link is a strictly increasing function in flows allocated to each link.
The next step in modeling the wormhole attack is to characterize the delays experienced by the
wormhole links, which is the topic of the following section.
B. Delay Characteristics of the Out-of-Band Wormhole
For the out-of-band wormhole, we assume that the wormhole tunnel uses a high-throughput
channel, so that the delay for packets traversing the wormhole tunnel l is equal to the propagation
delay αl. Let Φl(rl) denote the fraction of packets dropped by the wormhole, which we assume
to be increasing in rl. The delay for packets traversing the wormhole tunnel, equal to the time
per packet transmission multiplied by the average number of retransmissions, is therefore given
by
pl =
αl
1− Φl(rl) .
Since the packet-loss rate Φl is increasing in rl, pl is increasing as a function of rl as well,
thus preserving the passivity property required by the proof of Theorem 4.6. In what follows, we
provide a method for modeling the packet-loss rate Φl(rl) based on the goals of the adversary.
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In mounting the wormhole attack, the goal of the adversary is to attract flow to the wormhole
tunnel, in order to either selectively drop packets or mount secondary attacks. The rate at which
packets are dropped by the adversary is equal to Φl(rl)rl, while we model the utility of the
adversary from mounting secondary attacks as UA(rl). The adversary’s overall utility is therefore
given by Φl(rl)rl + UA(rl). By decreasing Φl, the adversary increases rl and hence UA(rl), at
the cost of dropping fewer packets.
The optimal dropping rate depends on the flow rate through the wormhole link in steady-
state, which in turn depends on the delays experienced by the other links in the network, since
higher delays at other links will increase the flow allocated to the wormhole link. Based on
the network topology, the adversary estimates the delay between source Si and destination Di
as ζd(Si, Di), where ζ ≥ 0 is the per-hop delay and d(·, ·) is the length of the shortest path
between two nodes. Similarly, the delay experienced by the wormhole path will be equal to
ζd(Si,W1)+
αl
1−Φl(rl) +ζd(W2, Di), where W1 and W2 are the entrance and exit to the wormhole
tunnel, respectively. Define ∆i,l by
∆i,l = ζ(d(Si, Di)− (d(Si,W1) + d(W2, Di))).
By Proposition 4.3, the flow from source Si to destination Di will traverse the wormhole tunnel
if and only if the delay experienced by the wormhole path is less than the delay experienced
by the next-shortest path. Hence, the flow from source Si to destination Di that traverses the
wormhole tunnel in steady-state will be equal to
r∗i,l ,
 ri, pl < ∆i,l0, else
Without loss of generality, assume that the indices i are rank-ordered such that ∆1,l > ∆2,l >
· · · > ∆n,l, and define i∗ = max {i : pl < ∆i,l}. The flow rate r∗l traversing the wormhole in
steady-state is equal to
r∗l =
i∗∑
i=1
ri. (3)
The following proposition describes the set of possible optimal packet-dropping rates Φ∗l at
equilibrium.
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Proposition 4.7: The possible solutions Φ∗l to the optimization problem
maximize r∗l (Φl)Φl + UA(r
∗
l (Φl))
Φl
s.t. Φl ∈ [0, 1]
(4)
are given by {γ1, . . . , γn}, where
γi = 1− αl
∆i,l
− 
for some  << 1.
Proof: Suppose that the optimal solution Φ∗l to (4) lies within the interval (γi, γi+1) for
some i. Then by definition of γi, p∗l > ∆l,i+1 and p
∗
l < ∆l,i, so that i
∗ = i. Consider Φ∗l + δ for
some δ > 0 satisfying Φ∗l + δ < γi+1. Then by (3),
r∗l (Φ
∗
l ) =
i∑
k=1
rk = r
∗
l (Φ
∗
l + δ).
We therefore have that
r∗l (Φ
∗
l )Φ
∗
l + UA(r
∗
l (Φ
∗
l )) < r
∗
l (Φ
∗
l )(Φ
∗
l + δ) + UA(r
∗
l (Φ
∗
l ))
= r∗l (Φ
∗
l + δ)(Φ
∗
l + δ) + UA(r
∗
l (Φ
∗
l + δ)),
contradicting the assumption that Φ∗l is optimal.
The adversary can therefore determine the optimal packet-dropping rate at equilibrium, Φ∗l ,
by evaluating r∗l Φ
∗
l +UA(r
∗
l ) at the set of points Φ
∗
l = γ1, . . . , γn and choosing Φ
∗
l that gives the
maximum value of r∗l (Φl)Φl + UA(r
∗
l (Φl)).
C. Model of Mitigation for Out-of-Band Wormhole
The mitigation model is as follows. Each packet is assigned a packet leash chosen by the
source, so that the packet is valid for time R
c
+ ∆max, where R is the propagation distance, c
is the speed of light, and ∆max is the maximum permissible value of the clock skew. When the
packet traverses a wormhole, the packet violates the packet leash requirement and is dropped
when
R1
c
+
R2
c
+ αl + ∆ >
R
c
+ ∆max,
where R1 and R2 are the distances of the sender and receiver from the wormhole start and end
points, respectively, and αl is the wormhole tunnel propagation time as in the previous section.
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The random variable ∆ represents the clock skew between the nodes comprising the link. Hence
the probability of a packet drop is equal to
Pd =
 Pr (∆ > ∆max) , l validPr (∆ > 1
c
(R−R1 −R2)− αl + ∆max
)
, l wormhole
(5)
We assume that the network maintains a lower threshold ∆max, representing a more stringent
mitigation strategy, when the rate of flow through a link increases. From (5), the packet drop
rate is therefore an increasing function of ∆max.
The effect of the packet leash can be modeled by the increase in delay for each packet
due to retransmissions. This additive delay is equal to
(
1
1−Pd − 1
)
fl(rl), which represents the
additional delay due to packet leash. The dynamics of the additive delay introduced by the
mitigation mechanism are given as
(H3)
 r˙l(t) = u
(3)
l (t)
y
(3)
l (t) =
(
1
1−Pd − 1
)
(fl(rl(t)))
D. Steady-state and Stability Analysis for the Out-of-Band Wormhole
In this section, we analyze the steady-state characteristics of the overall system. As a first
step, we define the system (H˜3) as
(H˜3)
 r˙l(t) = u
(3)
l (t)
y˜
(3)
l (t) =
(
1
1−Pd − 1
)
(fl(rl(t)))−
(
1
1−P ∗d
− 1
)
fl(r
∗
l )
where P ∗d is the probability of packet drops when the flow allocated to link l is r
∗
l . The joint
dynamics of the flow allocation, wormhole delay, delays on valid links, and delay introduced
by mitigation mechanisms can be represented as a negative feedback interconnection between
dynamical systems (H˜1), (H˜2), and (H˜3) (Figure 4). The following lemma guarantees global
asymptotic stability of the overall system.
Lemma 4.8: The system (H˜3) is passive from input u
(3)
l (t) to output y˜
(3)
l (t).
Proof: Define Vl(rl) =
∫ rl
r∗l
((
1
1−Pd(s) − 1
)
fl(s)−
(
1
1−P ∗d
− 1
)
fl(r
∗
l )
)
ds.
Since
(
1
1−Pd(s) − 1
)
fl(s) is nondecreasing as a function of s, Vl ≥ 0. Furthermore, Vl(r∗l ) = 0
and
V˙l(t) =
((
1
1− Pd(rl) − 1
)
fl(rl)−
(
1
1− P ∗d
− 1
)
fl(r
∗
l )
)
r˙l = r˙ly˜
(3)
l (t),
thus establishing passivity of (H˜3).
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Fig. 4. Block diagram illustrating the out-of-band wormhole link and mitigation. As in Figure 3, systems (H˜1) and (H˜2) are
passive dynamical systems representing flow allocation and link delays respectively. Passive dynamical system (H˜3) represents
the network mitigation mechanisms. By Corollary 4.9, the interconnection of these passive systems is asymptotically stable.
Corollary 4.9: The system of Figure 4 is globally asymptotically stable.
Proof: By Theorem 4.6, the blocks (H˜1) and (H˜2) in Figure 4 form a negative feedback
interconnection of passive systems, and hence are passive. Since (H˜3) is passive by Lemma 4.8,
the system consists of a negative feedback interconnection of passive systems, which is globally
asymptotically stable.
Corollary 4.9 implies that the overall system consisting of the flow allocation, out-of-band
wormhole, and mitigation converges to a unique stable equilibrium point. This enables the
characterization of delay experienced by the networked control system in steady state.
Our passivity based approach for modeling and mitigating in-band wormhole attacks is de-
scribed in the following section.
V. PROPOSED PASSIVITY FRAMEWORK FOR IN-BAND WORMHOLE
In this section, we present a passivity framework for modeling and detecting in-band wormhole
attacks mounted by colluding malicious nodes. As in the out-of-band case, the goal of each
source is to select the flow rate on each path in order to minimize the average delay experienced
while avoiding the wormhole tunnel. In designing network dynamics, including the source rates
and detection mechanism, that achieve this goal, we first model the delay experienced on the
wormhole link as a function of the number of compromised nodes. Since the delay depends
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on the number of compromised nodes, we then model the temporal dynamics of the number of
compromised nodes. Lastly, we incorporate the impact of the detection mechanism described in
Section III on both the valid and wormhole links, and show stability of the overall system.
A. Delay Characteristics of the In-Band Wormhole
Delays experienced by packets traversing an in-band wormhole are proportional to the number
of nodes comprising the wormhole tunnel. Let W1 and W2 denote the compromised nodes that
create the in-band wormhole tunnel. Recall from Section III that, in order to avoid wormhole
tunnel collapse, packets entering the wormhole tunnel must be routed through a third colluding
node, denoted W3. The number of hops in the wormhole tunnel is therefore equal to d(W1,W3)+
d(W3,W2). Furthermore, from Lemma 3.1, the node W3 must satisfy
d(W1,W3) < d(W2,W3) + 3. (6)
While the locations of W1 and W2 are fixed for a given wormhole tunnel, the location of W3
depends on the set of nodes compromised by the adversary, denoted C.
In order to minimize delays, and therefore attract more network flow to the wormhole tunnel,
the adversary selects the node W3 ∈ C that minimizes d(W1,W3) + d(W3,W2) to collude in
establishing the wormhole, subject to the constraint (6). Letting x denote the fraction of nodes
that are misbehaving, and letting C˜ = {W3 ∈ C : d(W1,W3) < d(W2,W3) + 3}, we define
β(x) , E[min {d(W1,W3) + d(W3,W2) : W3 ∈ C˜} | |C| = nx],
where E(·) denotes expectation and n is the total number of nodes.
Since the delay experienced by the in-band wormhole is a function of the fraction of com-
promised nodes, a dynamical model of the fraction of compromised nodes is required.
B. Dynamics of Fraction of Compromised Nodes
The goal of the adversary is to minimize the delay of the wormhole link by compromising
nodes. We let cAx, where cA > 0, denote the cost of compromising a fraction x of the nodes,
and define the adversary’s utility function by
UA(x) , (n− β(x))− cAx,
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where the first term is the reduction in the path length caused by compromising the fraction
of nodes x, and cAx is the cost. In order to obtain the maximum value, we assume that the
adversary chooses the rate at which nodes are compromised via a gradient ascent algorithm, so
that
x˙(t) = (−β′(x)− cA)+, (7)
where (z)+ = z if z ≥ 0 and (z)+ = 0 otherwise. The following proposition proves that UA(x)
has a unique global maximum.
Proposition 5.1: Suppose that, for a given value of x, the set of compromised nodes is chosen
uniformly at random from Cx = {C : |C| = nx}. Then the function β(x) is decreasing and convex
in x.
A proof is given in the appendix. Intuitively, β(x) is a non-increasing function in x since as
the number of colluding malicious nodes increases, the number of paths that can potentially be
used as in-band wormhole tunnels also increases.
Proposition 5.1 implies that the dynamics (7) converge to a unique equilibrium which is the
global maximum of the utility function. To complete the model of the in-band wormhole, the
next step is modeling the mitigation by the network.
C. Model of Mitigation for In-Band Wormhole
The detection of the in-band wormhole is based on the probability that a communication link
is a wormhole tunnel, given observation of the flow rate through the link and the associated delay
characteristics. A link experiencing anomalously long delays is judged to have a high probability
of being a wormhole. We define B1 as the event that link l is a wormhole and B0 as the event
that link l is valid. Furthermore, we let wl(t) denote the system’s belief at time t that the link l
is a wormhole, with
wl(t) = Pr(B1|rl(t), pl(t)),
where
pl(t) =
 fl(rl(t)), l validβl(x)f(rl), l wormhole
The effect of the detection process on the flow allocation is modeled as an increase in the
link price, so that the price is increased by K1(wl(t) > w), where K represents a penalty for
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routing packets through suspected wormhole links, 1 denotes the indicator function, and w is a
predefined threshold.
A model of the wormhole delay dynamics, taking the derivative of the source rate r˙ as input
and giving the delay p− p∗ as output, is given by
(Hl)

r˙l(t) = u(t)
x˙(t) = (−β′(x)− cA)+
yl(t) = βl(x)f(rl) +K(1(wl(t) > w))
The source rate dynamics are unchanged from Section IV, since detection is performed at the
link instead of the source level. The steady-state behavior of the system is described as follows.
D. Steady-state and Stability Analysis for the In-Band Wormhole
In this section, we prove the stability of the in-band wormhole, enabling us to characterize
the average delay due to the wormhole in steady state. Stability of the network in the presence
of the in-band wormhole is a result of the following proposition, which establishes the passivity
of the wormhole link price.
Proposition 5.2: The wormhole link dynamics (Hl) are passive with input r˙l and output yl.
Proof: To prove passivity when l is a wormhole link, we use the Lyapunov function Vl(·)
defined by
Vl(rl, x) =
∫ rl
r∗l
βl(x)f(s)− βl(x∗)f(r∗l ) +K(1(wl(t) > w)− 1(w∗l > w)) ds
+
∫ x
x∗
(∫ r∗l
0
f(v) dv
)
β′l(s) ds.
We have
V˙l(rl, x) = (βl(x)f(rl)− βl(x∗)f(r∗l ) +K(1(wl(t) > w)− 1(w∗l > w)))ul
+β′l(x)
(∫ rl
r∗l
f(s) ds+
∫ r∗l
0
f(s) ds
)
x˙
= ylul + β
′
l(x)
(∫ rl
0
f(s) ds
)
(−β′l(x)− cA)+
≤ ylul,
where the final inequality follows from the the fact that βl(x) is nonincreasing (Proposition
5.1) and f(s) ≥ 0. The fact that Vl(r∗l , x∗) = 0 holds by inspection. It remains to show that
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Vl(rl, x) ≥ 0 for all rl and x. This holds because fl and 1(wl(t) > w) are assumed to be
nondecreasing functions of rl, while β′l is an increasing funtion of x by Proposition 5.1.
The stability of the system under the in-band wormhole attack is established by the following
theorem.
Theorem 5.3: The source rate ri satisfies limt→∞ ri(t) = r∗i .
Proof: The proof follows from the passivity of the source rate (Theorem 4.6) and wormhole
delay (Proposition 5.2), and the fact that they form a negative feedback interconnection.
Theorem 5.3 implies that the average delay converges to a stable point in the presence of
in-band wormhole.
In what follows, using our framework, we show how complex wormhole attacks consisting
of both in- and out-of band wormholes can be jointly modeled and mitigated.
VI. JOINT MODELING OF OUT-OF-BAND AND IN-BAND WORMHOLES
At present, in the security literature, out-of-band wormholes and in-band-wormholes are treated
using different methods. A more general wormhole that consists of in-band and out-of-band
wormholes has not been identified or discussed, though such wormholes can be conceived. Our
framework can naturally model complex wormholes formed by composing in-band and out-of-
band wormholes.
We consider a system with a set of out-of-band wormhole links L′ = {l′1, . . . , l′w} and in-
band wormhole links L′′ = {l′′1 , . . . , l′′w}. The delay experienced by a valid link is an increasing
function of rl, the flow through the link. The delay experienced by an out-of-band wormhole
link is defined by the propagation time and the packet dropping rate, as described in Section
IV. For an in-band wormhole link, the delay experienced by the wormhole link is function of
the expected number of hops in the wormhole tunnel, as described in Section V. These delay
characteristics are described by the following dynamics, where the input u(t) is equal to the
change in the source rate r˙(t):
(Hl)

r˙l(t) = ul(t)
yl(t) =
αl
1−Φl(rl) −
αl
1−Φl(r∗l )
, l ∈ L′
yl(t) = βl(x)f(rl)− βl(x∗)f(r∗l ), l ∈ L′′
yl(t) = fl(rl)− fl(r∗l ), else
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Fig. 5. Illustration of the interconnection between flow allocation, link delay characteristics, and mitigation when multiple
out-of-band and in-band wormholes are present. The system H1 defines the flow allocation dynamics as a function of observed
delays. The system Hl defines the delays experienced by valid, out-of-band, and in-band wormhole links as a function of the
flow rates. The system HD models the impact of mitigation mechanisms on the flow allocation dynamics.
We assume that the network employs mitigation schemes for both the in- and out-of-band
wormholes. The out-of-band wormhole mitigation mechanism increases the delay on valid and
out-of-band wormhole links as discussed in Section IV. However, since the in-band wormhole
contains colluding nodes that can modify the time stamps using valid cryptographic keys, the
out-of-band wormhole mitigation is ineffective and hence adds no delay to in-band wormhole
links. The in-band wormhole mitigation mechanism described in Section V is employed on the
valid and in-band wormhole links. Since the out-of-band wormhole link is created using a high
capacity, low-latency channel, the adversary can manipulate the delays in order to thwart the
statistical mitigation mechanism. Hence our model of the impact of mitigation on the link delays
is given by the following dynamics:
(HD)

r˙l(t) = ul(t)
yl(t) =
(
1
1−Pd − 1
)
fl(rl)−
(
1
1−P ∗d
− 1
)
fl(r
∗
l ), l ∈ L′
yl(t) = K(1(wl(t) > w)− 1(w∗l > w)), l ∈ L′′
yl(t) =
(
1
1−Pd − 1
)
fl(rl)−
(
1
1−P ∗d
− 1
)
fl(r
∗
l ) +K(1(wl(t) > w)− 1(w∗l > w)), else
The flow allocation, delay, and mitigation models are illustrated in Figure 5. The following
theorem characterizes the stability properties of the system when both in-band and out-of-band
wormholes are present.
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Theorem 6.1: The interconnected system of Figure 5 is globally asymptotically stable.
Proof: By Theorem 4.6, the top block of Figure 5 is strictly passive. The blocks Hl and
HD are passive by Theorem 4.6 (if l is an out-of-band wormhole) and Proposition 5.2 (if l
is an in-band wormhole). Hence the negative feedback interconnection of Figure 5 is globally
asymptotically stable.
Theorem 6.1 implies the passivity based framework enables us to compose in-band and out-
of-band wormholes and characterize the overall delay and flow allocation.
VII. NUMERICAL STUDY
In this section, we conduct a numerical study using MATLAB. We use our passivity-based
framework to answer the following questions for the out-of-band and in-band wormhole attacks:
1) What is the overall flow allocated and delays experienced by sources for a given adversary’s
strategy? and 2) How do the proposed mitigation methods affect the flow allocation and delays
experienced by sources? 3) What is the impact of wormhole attack on a networked control
system?
We consider a network which consists of two source nodes S1, S2 and a single destination node
D shown in Figure 6. The source rates for sources 1 and 2 are given as 10 and 5, respectively.
Each source allocates flows to three different paths. We denote the path which traverses links 4
and 5 as path 1, the path which traverses links 6 and 7 as path 2, and the path which traverses
link 9 as path 3. We assume the propagation delays for valid links are equal and normalized to
1 time unit. The average delay is given as the propagation delay times the expected number of
transmissions. The expected number of transmissions for a link is given as 1
1−Pd where Pd is the
probability of a packet drop. For valid links, we assume the probability of packet drop is due to
buffer overflow in an M/M/1/K queue [17]. We denote ρl = rlcl , where rl is the amount of traffic
flowing into link l, and cl is the capacity of link l. The probability of a packet drop is given as
Pd =
ρK − ρK+1
1− ρK+1 (8)
In this simulation, we assume the buffer size K = 5 for all links.
The propagation delay for the wormhole tunnel, αl, is assumed to be 2. The clock skew ∆ is
an exponential random variable with mean 1. ∆max is given as
∆max = αl − 1 + 1
r
, (9)
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Fig. 6. Network topology used in numerical study. Two sources send flows with total rate of 10 and 5 to destination D. Each
source maintains a path through links 4 and 5 (path 1), a path through links 6 and 7 (path 2), and a path through the wormhole
link 9 (path 3).
which is a monotonic decreasing function in r.
A. Simulation of the Out-of-band Wormhole
In the out-of-band wormhole simulation, we assume that link 9 in Figure 6 is the wormhole
link. The propagation delay for the wormhole link is denoted as αl, where αl > 1 due to longer
physical distance the packet traverses through the wormhole link. The delay for the wormhole
link is given as αl
1−Φ(r) where Φ(r) is the dropping rate of packets that flow into the wormhole
link. The function Φ(r) is given as Φ(r) = (1− 1
r
)1(r>1).
We illustrate the impact of the out-of-band wormhole by comparing the flow allocation without
the wormhole (Figure 7(a)) with the flow allocation resulting from the wormhole (Figure 7(b)).
In both cases, simulation result shows that our choice of dynamics results in the convergence
to the stable equilibrium. Figure 7(a) shows that when path 3 contains a poor quality link with
low capacity of 0.01 (link 9), both sources allocate negligible amount of flows to path 3 in
equilibrium. Figure 7(b) shows that packet drops by the wormhole path result in increased delay
on path 3, thus reducing the flow allocated to path 3. At the equilibrium, the wormhole drops
half of the packets on average. As a result, the wormhole is able to attract only 2 units of flow
from both source 1 and 2 combined.
Figure 7(d) shows that in order to attract flow, the wormhole has to provide a low-latency link
whose performance is comparable to other links. Therefore, the average delay experienced by the
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Fig. 7. Simulation of our passivity framework for modeling the out-of-band wormhole. The time scales represent the number
of iterations of the simulation. Each iteration represents a single update step of the wormhole dynamics. The source rates for
sources 1 and 2 are given as 10 and 5. Initial flow allocation for source 1 is [5,2,3], and flow allocation for source 2 is [2,2,1]
for paths 1, 2, and 3 respectively. (a) The convergence of flow allocation without the wormhole when link 9 has capacity 0.01.
(b) The impact of the wormhole on flow allocation with no mitigation mechanisms. (c) The flow allocation when packet leashes
method are used.
sources is approximately the same regardless of the presence of the wormhole link. Figure 7(c)
shows that when packet leash mitigation methods are employed, the amount of flow allocated
to the wormhole link is reduced from 2 to 1.3 units. The overall delay, however, increases due
to packet drops caused by the packet leash mitigation method.
B. Simulation of the In-band Wormhole
In the in-band wormhole simulation, we assume that link 9 is an in-band wormhole. Upon
receiving packets allocated to path 3, the malicious node allocates λ fraction of traffic to path
1 and 1 − λ fraction of traffic to path 2. This results in increased traffic to paths 1 and 2 and
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(a) (b) (c)
Fig. 8. Simulation of our passivity framework for modeling the in-band wormhole. The time scales represent the number of
iterations of the simulation. Each iteration represents a single update step of the in-band wormhole dynamics. The source rates
for sources 1 and 2 are given as 10 and 5. Initial flow allocation for source 1 is [0.5,0.5,9], and flow allocation for source
2 is [0.5,0.5,4] for paths 1, 2, and 3 respectively. Link 9 is an wormhole link with falsely advertised capacity of 15. Packets
allocated to path 3 will be rerouted to path 1 with probability 0.3 and to path 2 with probability 0.7. (a) The impact of an
in-band wormhole on flow allocation with no mitigation mechanisms. b) The flow allocation when mitigation method is used.
(c) The impact of mitigation method on average delay.
hence increased overall delay experienced by sources. The perceived delay for path 3 is given
as
q(P3) = λq(rP1 + λrP3) + (1− λ)q(rP2 + (1− λ)rP3) (10)
The mitigation mechanism is based on the anomalous delay experienced at the wormhole link.
The link will be avoided if the ratio of actual delay experienced at link l, denoted Dl, to the
expected delay exceeds a predefined threshold. The penalty of K = 10 was added to the link
price when
log
Dl
fl(rl)
> 0 (11)
The delay experienced at link l is modeled as an exponential random variable with mean fl(rl).
We illustrate the impact of the in-band wormhole on flow allocation (Figure 8(a)). Packets
allocated to path 3, which contains the wormhole link, are rerouted by the adversary to path 2
with probability 0.7. This results in longer delay experienced over path 2. Without mitigation,
source 1 is unaware of packets flowing through wormhole tunnels, and allocates all its traffic
through paths 1 and 3. Figure 8(b) shows the flow allocation when statistical mitigation method,
as described in (11), is used. Since the packets allocated to path 3 do not traverse a one-hop link
with capacity 15 as advertised, but instead traverse a two-hop path with lower capacity, the delay
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will deviate significantly from its expected value. Hence the statistical mitigation mechanism will
identify the wormhole link (link 9) with high probability. This results in an equilibrium point
similar to the case without wormhole. Figure 8(c) shows the impact of mitigation on average
delay. The average delay experienced by source 1 is reduced when mitigation is used. These
results suggest that the sources become aware of the true topology of the network, which does
not contain path 3, and achieve a Wardrop equilibrium consisting only of paths 1 and 2.
C. Simulation of Impact of Out-of-band Wormhole on a Physical System
We now study the impact of the out-of-band wormhole on a physical system. We consider
a networked control system where the control loop is closed through the network shown in
Figure 6. The physical plant considered is a single-input, single-output integrator with dynamics
given in equation (12). We assume the state value x(t) is measured, and sampled every h = 0.3
time units by node S1 and relayed to the controller node D. Disturbance w(t) is assumed to be
white Gaussian noise with zero mean and variance 1. Control gain G = 2 is considered in the
simulation.
x˙(t) = u(t) + w(t), t ∈ [kh+ τk, (k + 1)h+ τk+1]
u(t) = −Gx(t− τk), t ∈ [kh+ τk, (k + 1)h+ τk+1]
(12)
We consider the same M/M/1/K queue model for valid links except the propagation delay αl
for valid links is now assumed to be 0.05 time units, and propagation delay for the out-of-band
wormhole link (link 9) is assumed to be 0.1 time units. Adversary controlling the wormhole link
provides a low-latency link with delay 0.1 when the flow rate traversing through the wormhole
is less than 5 units of flow, and once the flow rate through the wormhole link exceeds 5 units
of flow, the adversary drops packets with probability 0.9.
We illustrate the impact of out-of-band wormhole on the physical system in three different
cases. In the first case, we assume no mitigation strategy is employed by the network. In the
second and third cases, we assume packet leash defense is employed with ∆max = 0.04 and
∆max = 0.1 respectively. The clock skew ∆ is assumed to be an exponential random variable
with mean 0.05.
The impact of wormhole on the physical plant when no mitigation strategy is employed is
illustrated in Figure 9(a). Adversary first starts providing a low-latency link, attracting a large
amount of packets traversing through the wormhole. Once the flow rate through the wormhole
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exceeds the threshold, the adversary drops packets with high probability, resulting in large
oscillation of the plant state x(t). Source node S1 reallocates flows to paths 1 and 2 once high
delay is observed on path 3, and adversary starts attracting flows again by providing low-latency
link.
Figures 9(b) and (c) illustrate the effect of mitigation strategies on the physical plant. In
both cases, flows allocated to path 3 quickly converges to 0 due to packet leash. However, as
shown in Figure 9(b), a stringent packet leash with ∆max = 0.04 results in growing oscillation
of x(t) due to overall increased delay. On the other hand, Figure 9(c) illustrates that when
∆max is chosen appropriately as ∆max = 0.1, the plant stabilizes around the equilibrium point
while successfully mitigating the wormhole attack. This case study shows that parameters of
the defense mechanism need to be chosen and adjusted over time to mitigate the attack while
maintaining the performance of the physical plant.
(a) (b) (c)
Fig. 9. State trajectory x(t) in the presence of out-of-band wormhole. (a) No mitigation strategy employed (b) Packet-leash is
employed with ∆max = 0.04 (c) Packet-leash is employed with ∆max = 0.1
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we studied the wormhole attack on networked control systems, in which an
adversary creates a link between two geographically distant network regions, either using a
side channel, as in the out-of-band wormhole, or by colluding network nodes, as in the in-band
wormhole. Using the wormhole attack, the adversary can cause violations of timing constraints in
real-time systems, including dropping or delaying packets flowing into wormholes. We presented
a passivity-based control-theoretic framework for modeling and mitigating the wormhole attack.
Under our framework, the flow allocation of the valid nodes, the delays experienced on the
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wormholes, and the wormhole mitigation algorithms were modeled as distinct, interconnected
passive dynamical systems. The passivity approach enabled us to prove stability and convergence
of the system to a unique equilibrium, which satisfies the criteria for the well-known Wardrop
equilibrium, under general assumptions on the adversary behavior and network mitigation mech-
anism. This allowed us to characterize the delays experienced by source nodes at the steady-state.
For the out-of-band wormhole attack, we quantified the increase in delay caused by the
wormhole link and mapped the adversary’s strategy to the optimization problem of selecting the
packet-dropping rate. We also introduced an approach for dynamically adapting the parameters
of packet leash-based defenses in response to the observed network delays. For the in-band
wormhole, we used spatial statistics to estimate the delays experienced by the wormhole tunnel
as a function of the number of misbehaving network nodes. In addition, we identified a new
class of complex wormhole attacks consisting of both in- and out-of band wormholes, which we
modeled and analyzed using our framework.
Our simulation results illustrate the trade-off between the effectiveness of the network defense
and the increase in delay for the out-of-band case. In particular, we found that out-of-band
wormhole causes large disturbances in the physical system by selectively dropping packets, and
the parameters of packet leash defense can be chosen to reduce flow allocation to the wormhole
while satisfying the delay constraint of the physical system. For the in-band case, our simulation
suggests that the network defense allows the system to reach the same flow allocation equilibrium
regardless of the presence of wormhole.
In our future work, we will investigate whether the steady-state values of our passivity
framework arise as equilibria of an equivalent dynamic game between the network and adversary.
APPENDIX A
BACKGROUND ON PASSIVITY
We consider a state-space model (Σ), with state x(t), input u(t), and output y(t), defined by
(Σ)
 x˙(t) = f(x(t), u(t))y(t) = g(x(t), u(t))
The definitions and results in this subsection can be found in [18]. A passive system is defined
as follows.
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Definition A.1: The system (Σ) is passive if there exists a nonnegative C1 function V : R→
R≥0 satisfying V (0) = 0 and
V˙ (t) ≤ −S(x(t)) + u(t)Ty(t) (13)
where S(·) is a nonnegative continuous function. If S(x) > 0 for all x 6= 0, then the system is
strictly passive. A function V satisfying (13) for a system (Σ) is a storage function for (Σ).
The following two lemmas are used to construct passive systems as interconnections of passive
components.
Lemma A.2: Suppose that the system (Σ) is passive with u(t) ∈ Rm and y(t) ∈ Rn. Then for
any m× n matrix A, the system Σ′, defined by
(Σ′)
 x˙(t) = f(x(t), ATu′(t))y′(t) = Ag(x(t), ATu′(t))
is passive from input u′ ∈ Rn to output y′ ∈ Rm.
Lemma A.3: The negative feedback interconnection of two passive systems is passive. If at
least one of the systems is strictly passive, then the negative feedback interconnection is strictly
passive.
Passivity leads to a variety of techniques for guaranteeing stability of dynamical systems, such
as the following proposition.
Proposition A.4: A negative feedback interconnection between two passive systems is globally
asymptotically stable if at least one of the systems is strictly passive.
For a negative feedback interaction between two strictly passive systems with storage functions
V1 and V2, the function V = V1 + V2 is a Lyapunov function for the combined system.
APPENDIX B
PROOFS OF PROPOSITION 4.2, LEMMA 4.4, AND PROPOSITION 5.1
Proof of Proposition 4.2: We first show that
∑
P∈Pi rP (t) = ri for all t > 0. We have that∑
P∈Pi rP (0) = ri and, by (1),
d
dt
(∑
P∈Pi
rP (t)
)
= 0.
Hence
∑
P∈Pi rP (t) = ri for all t > 0. Now, suppose that for some P ∈ Pi and some t > 0,
rP (t) < 0. Since rP is continuous as a function of time, rP (t′) = 0 for some t′ < t. Define
t∗ , sup {t′ : rP (t′) = 0, t′ < t}.
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Suppose that P 6= P ∗(t∗). Then
r˙P (t
∗) = −{qP (rP )− qP ∗(r∗P )}rP+ .
By definition of P ∗(t∗), qP (rP ) ≥ qP ∗(r∗P ) and rP (t∗) ≥ 0, which implies that there exists  > 0
with rP (t∗ + ) ≥ 0. Hence, there exists t′′ ∈ (t∗, t) such that rP (t′′) = 0, contradicting the
definition of t∗.
Now, suppose that P = P ∗(t∗). Then by the preceding discussion, r˙P ′(t∗) ≤ 0 for all P ′ 6= P ,
resulting in
r˙P (t
∗) = −
∑
P ′ 6=P ∗
r˙P (t
∗) ≥ 0,
which contradicts the definition of t∗. Hence rP (t) ≥ 0 for all P ∈ Pi and t ≥ 0.
Proof of Lemma 4.4: By Proposition 4.3, it suffices to characterize the Wardrop equilibria
of the system. From [16], a point r = {ri : i = 1, . . . ,m} is a Wardrop equilibrium if and only
if it is a solution to the optimization problem
minr
∑
l∈L hl(rl)
s.t.
∑
P∈Pi rP = ri, i = 1, . . . ,m
rP ≥ 0, P ∈ ∪mi=1Pi
rl =
∑
P3l rP
(14)
where hl : R→ R is defined by
hl(x) ,
∫ x
0
fl(s) ds.
Since fl is assumed to be strictly increasing, hl is strictly convex. Problem (14) therefore involves
minimizing a strictly convex objective function over a convex set, and hence has a unique
solution. Thus there is a unique Wardrop equilibrium, and hence there is a unique equilibrium
of (1) by Proposition 4.3.
Proof of Proposition 4.5: The dynamics (1) with the input qP (t) =
∑
l∈P fl(rl(t)) can be
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written as
(H)

r˙P (t) = −{u(1)P − u(1)Pmin}rP+ , P 6= Pmini
r˙P (t) = −
∑
P 6=Pmin r˙P (t), P = P
min
i
y
(1)
P (t) = r˙P (t), ∀P ∈ Pi
u
(2)
l (t) = A
T r˙(t) ∀l ∈ L
z˙l(t) = u
(2)
l (t) ∀l ∈ L
y
(2)
l (t) = fl(zl(t)) ∀l ∈ L
u
(1)
P (t) = Ay
(2)(t) ∀P ∈ Pi
Setting y˜(2)l (t) = fl(zl(t))− fl(z∗l ) and u˜(1)(t) = −Ay˜(2)(t) yields the equivalent system
(H˜)

˙˜rP (t) = −{q∗P − u˜1P − q∗P ∗(q∗−u˜1) + u˜(1)P ∗(q∗−u)}rP+ , P 6= P ∗(q∗ − u˜1)
˙˜rP (t) = −
∑
P 6=P ∗(q∗−u˜1) ˙˜rP (t), P = P
∗(q∗ − u˜1)
y˜
(1)
P (t) =
˙˜rP (t), ∀P ∈ Pi
u˜(2)(t) = AT ˙˜r(t)
z˙l(t) = u˜
(2)
l (t) ∀l ∈ L
y˜
(2)
l (t) = fl(zl(t))− fl(z∗l ) ∀l ∈ L
u˜
(1)
P (t) = −Ay(2)(t) ∀P ∈ Pi
which can be decomposed as the negative feedback interconnection of (H˜1) and (H˜2).
Proof of Proposition 5.1: First, suppose that x′ > x. Define Ex(·) = E(· | |C| = nx) and
Prx(·) = Pr(· | |C| = nx). Then
β(x′)− β(x) = Ex
[
min
{
d(W1,W3) + d(W3,W2) : W3 ∈ C˜
}]
−Ex
[
min
{
d(W1,W3) + d(W3,W2) : W3 ∈ C˜
}]
.
Since nodes are assumed to be compromised uniformly at random Prx(C) = 1|Cx| for all C ∈ Cx,
and so
β(x′)− β(x) = 1|Cx′|
∑
C∈Cx′
min {d(W1,W3) + d(W3,W2) : W3 ∈ C˜}
− 1|Cx|
∑
C∈Cx
min {d(W1,W3) + d(W3,W2) : W3 ∈ C˜}
=
1
|Cx′|
∑
C∈Cx
∑
C′⊇C
min {d(W1,W3) + d(W3,W2) : W3 ∈ C˜ ′}
− 1|Cx|
∑
C∈Cx
min {d(W1,W3) + d(W3,W2) : W3 ∈ C˜}.
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Now, since C ⊆ C ′ in the inner summation,
min {d(W1,W3) + d(W3,W2) : W3 ∈ C˜ ′} ≤ min {d(W1,W3) + d(W3,W2) : W3 ∈ C˜},
which implies that
β(x′)− β(x) ≤ 1|Cx′ |
∑
C∈Cx
∑
C′⊇C
min {d(W1,W3) + d(W3,W2) : W3 ∈ C˜}
− 1|Cx|
∑
C∈Cx
min {d(W1,W3) + d(W3,W2) : W3 ∈ C˜} = 0,
as desired. To prove convexity, we have the following:
β(x) , Ex
[
min {d(W1,W3) + d(W3,W2) : W3 ∈ C˜}
]
=
∞∑
k=0
Prx(min {d(W1,W3) + d(W3,W2) : W3 ∈ C˜} > k)
=
∞∑
k=0
1
|Cx|
∑
C∈Cx
Pr
 ⋂
W3∈C˜
{d(W1,W3) + d(W3,W2) > k}
.
This right hand side can be rewritten as
β(x) =
∞∑
k=0
1
|Cx|
∑
C∈C§
Pr
( ⋂
W3∈C
({d(W1,W3) + d(W2,W3) > k} ∪ {W3 ∈ C})
)
=
∞∑
k=0
1
|Cx|
∑
C∈Cx
(Pr(d(W1,W ) + d(W2,W ) > k, d(W1,W3) < d(W2,W3) + 3))
nx,
where we use the fact that nodes are compromised uniformly at random. The final equality
establishes that β(x) is a nonnegative weighted sum of convex functions of x, and hence is
convex.
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